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Abstract. The Internet of Things is coming to fruition, but current
commercial offerings are dramatically insecure. The problem is not that
many individual devices are vulnerable, but that there are billions of such
devices and yet no concerted plan to make them secure. Since the IoT is
here to stay, and will pervade the fabric of our society in a way that will
make it impossible for any individual to opt out without retiring to a
cave as a hermit, we must address the problem structurally, rather than
with local band-aid fixes. This short position paper presents the basic
requirements for a scalable user authentication solution for the Internet
of Things. We hope it will stimulate a discussion leading to a coherent
user authentication architecture for IoT. Our vision is that even the
lowliest and most inexpensive of IoT devices ought to offer such basic
security properties, but this will only happen if they are agreed upon
and designed in from the start.
1 Introduction
Having been talked about under a variety of names for two or three decades, the
Internet of Things is finally coming to fruition. What is still missing, though,
is a proper security architecture for it. That currently deployed IoT devices are
insecure is testified by the plethora of vulnerabilities that are discovered and
exploited daily3: clearly “features” are higher priority than “security” in the eyes
of the purchasers—and therefore of the manufacturers. But we are talking here of
a more structural problem: not “this device is insecure” but “there is no strategic
plan and no accepted blueprint to make IoT devices secure”. We should also bear
in mind that if purchasers do not understand security vulnerabilities, or cannot
articulate their understanding, then manufacturers are unlikely to address them.
There is some role for government regulation. Indeed, the currently ongoing
“Secure by Design” initiative in the UK4, and corresponding ones in other coun-
tries, aims to establish a certification and labelling scheme that would assure to
consumers that a certain IoT product is free from basic vulnerabilities.
? Revision 16 of 2018-06-18 12:02:18 +0100 (Mon, 18 Jun 2018).
3 The Mirai botnet, which attacks IoT Linux-based IP cameras and home routers, is
the one that most people remember, at the time of writing, but it is by no means
an isolated incident.
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/secure-by-design
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In this position paper we do not address IoT security in general: instead
we focus specifically on the problem of user authentication, addressing which is
a pre-requisite of any security architecture insofar as the three crucial security
properties of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability can only be defined in
terms of the distinction between authorized and unauthorized users of the sys-
tem5. However, we should not be misled by the word “authorized”; authorized
users may misbehave.
2 The problem
Traditionally, user authentication has been addressed with usernames and pass-
words. This technology is strongly entrenched and difficult to replace, but it is
clearly showing its structural limitations in today’s computing context, where
even non-computer-experts have to wrestle with dozens of distinct accounts. Al-
though passwords continue to dominate on the web, they would be pathetically
inadequate for user authentication to the Internet of Things.
We define an IoT device as:
– an Internet-connected computing device,
– often (but not necessarily) embedded in an everyday object, that
– does not offer a traditional keyboard / screen / mouse UI, and
– connects to the network directly (rather than as a peripheral of a computer).
Examples of such devices include a pet monitoring IP camera, a smartwatch,
an IP-controlled central heating system controller, an IP lightbulb, the mythical
Internet-connected Refrigerator and, with a tip of the hat to Stuxnet, a remotely
controllable6 uranium enrichment turbine.
Each IoT device can be modelled as an object with methods. Security for
IoT is primarily about ensuring that only authorized principals can invoke the
methods offered by the object: only I and designated family members, but not a
would-be burglar or a stalker, should be able to see through the lens and listen
to the microphone of the cat-camera. This clearly requires a definition of “au-
thorized principals”, and the ability for the IoT device to distinguish authorized
from unauthorized principals. It may also be useful to consider limitations on
authorization, especially in the context of delegation: I might permit a neighbour
to keep an eye on my cat while I am on holiday but don’t want them to watch
me while I am at home.
Passwords are inadequate for this job, both because each of us will have
many more IoT devices than computers (and therefore the already unworkable
5 Confidentiality is the property of a system in which certain information may only be
read by authorized users. Integrity is the property of a system in which certain infor-
mation may only be altered by authorized users, and in compliance with designated
constraints. Availability is the property of a system to which authorized users have
access, with designated guarantees, regardless of attempts by unauthorized users to
deny such access.
6 Don’t believe in airgaps.
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proposition of a different password per account will never be able to scale) and
because IoT devices tend not to have a UI suited to password input.
As first steps towards a solution we seek to define the requirements of a valid
IoT user authentication strategy. What are the limitations of existing systems
that we would like to address?
3 IoT user authentication
A valid strategy for IoT user authentication must:
1. scale to thousands of controlled devices (in particular without burdening the
user’s memory);
2. be suitable for computer-illiterate people (certainly as far as the frequent “lo-
gin” action is concerned; but ideally also for the comparatively less frequent
“account setup” and “device registration” actions);
3. protect, within reason, against impersonation;
4. protect user privacy;
5. ensure that cracking one device does not imply cracking my other devices—
and that sharing key material with a device does not assist the manufacturer
of that device in cracking my other devices;
6. work even when I lose Internet connectivity.
Desirable additional features include the following.
7. A usable and expressive way of defining who is allowed to use what methods
and in what ways (hard and still unsolved research problem).
8. Revocable delegation of a subset of the user’s rights.
9. A domain should be able to accept credentials from another, for example
when granting my neighbour access to my cat camera.
It is well known that users cannot remember large numbers of secrets. If
forced to supply a password for each device they will share the same password
with many devices; more sophisticated users may use a password manager to
store passwords. However, it is not convenient to use a password manager to
authenticate to my fridge or my watch. A physical device holding my credentials
and capable of dispensing them wirelessly to the desired verifier when needed,
like Pico7, may be a more useful proposition.
Needham and Schroeder persuaded many of us to adopt authentication pro-
tocols and Kerberos popularised that suggestion. Quite correctly they observed
that, just because you share resources with other people, that does not mean
that you completely trust them. Passwords used to pass across networks in clear.
Authentication protocols can protect authentication information against eaves-
droppers while in transit.
Although Needham and Schroeder picked on a loose thread they did not
continue to unravel the torn jumper. Even when Kerberos is used to protect
7 SPW 2011, LNCS 7114.
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network traffic, an eavesdropper is still able to determine which devices are
communicating and when. Or, returning to our main theme, an eavesdropper
may be able to recognise that I am controlling my heating system from my office
and whether or not my motion-sensitive cat camera is sending data from my
sitting room. Either piece of information may be useful to potential burglars.
While confidentiality is all about preventing unauthorized access to the data,
privacy is also concerned with the metadata.
Mobile devices are often vulnerable to a similar problem. While it may be
convenient to unlock my computer using my phone or watch, I would prefer that
those devices didn’t act as small beacons signalling that I am not at home while
typing this paper. How nice things would be if I were able to limit reception of
such signals to just the computer I was unlocking—but that’s not the way things
usually work.
A proximity token like a “modern” wireless car key is not resistant to im-
personation: whoever finds it can use it. Some devices compensate for this by
requiring a PIN when you first put them on (e.g. the Apple Watch). While bio-
metrics may help with this, some manufacturers compensate for the false accept
rate by insisting on a PIN or password at intervals.
The kind of system we envisage as useful is based on the following design
principles:
1. Environments (homes, offices, nuclear power plants, etc) are conveniently
divided into domains, similar to Active Directory. Each domain will contain
at least one authentication server.
2. We anticipate that many people will not want the complication of a local
authentication server at home, so we imagine these might be provided re-
motely, perhaps as a cloud-based service. However, larger environments may
prefer to control their own server so it should also be possible to deploy this
locally. We also like to imagine using our devices on a cruise ship which may
have plentiful local network capacity but woeful Internet access. We suggest
that cruise ships ought to carry authentication servers.
3. To preserve privacy of communicating parties, authentication transactions
should not identify participants in clear, although we are willing to permit
partial identification as a compromise. For example, it would be very difficult
to hide all of the activity in my house while devices there are communicating
over the Internet, but it may be sufficient to combine the data from many
devices and to transmit spurious data so it is not clear when my cat camera
is active (Ron Rivest suggested Chaffing and Winnowing for this purpose).
4. There are facilities for deploying large batches of IoT devices in one go. The
symmetric key version is what SecureID does (here is a box of 50 tokens, each
with a serial number written on it, and here is a table mapping these serial
numbers to the secret keys embedded in the tokens). There is an equivalent
but somewhat more secure way of doing it with public key crypto (here is a
box of 50 tokens, each with a private key embedded in it that was generated
on the device and that no-one else has ever seen, and the serial number is a
hash of the public key; here is a table of the public keys and their hashes).
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We believe it is relatively easy to identify well-known existing technical se-
curity mechanisms that solve each of the above requirements in isolation; that
it is somewhat more challenging to combine them so as to solve all the above
requirements simultaneously; and that the really serious problem of authentica-
tion for IoT is how to do that in a way that remains easy to use for ordinary
people.
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